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Ontario’s revised plan for the tax treatment of new housing under an HST is 
a significant improvement over its original proposal, with lower economic cost
and less impact on homebuyers’ decisions. The benefits are instructive for 
those provinces that have not yet committed to harmonization.
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THE STUDY IN BRIEF 
This Backgrounder analyzes Ontario’s plans for the treatment of new housing under 
a new  Harmonized Sales Tax (HST) and presents the costs and benefits of options 
available to other provincial governments as they consider harmonizing their sales 
taxes with the federal Goods and Services Tax (GST). 
The proposed adoption of an HST in Ontario and British Columbia represents an 
intelligent tax reform that will benefit the economy as a whole, but the impact of the 
tax reform on new housing has been a thorny issue.  New housing is not directly 
taxed under provincial retail sales taxes (RSTs), but some sales taxes are embedded in 
the cost of construction.  The HST directly taxes housing, but there are rebates to 
make the tax change effectively neutral on housing under $400,000. 
In the original Ontario HST proposal in the 2009 Budget, buyers of new homes 
priced between $400,000 and $500,000 would have been required to pay back the 
rebates on the value of the house under $400,000. This would have resulted in an 
effective marginal tax rate of 47.3 percent in this price range. New housing over 
$500,000 would have faced the regular marginal tax rate after the rebates had been 
fully paid back. 
The revised Ontario proposal, created in response to industry opposition to the 
scheme, eliminates this “recapture” of rebates for homes between $400,000 and 
$500,000 and instead adopts a “flat tax” on homes above $400,000. British 
Columbia has adopted a similar approach to Ontario. 
This Backgrounder shows that the revised Ontario HST plan has less economic costs 
and impact on homebuyer decisions compared to the original proposal. However, 
this comes at the cost of  lower provincial revenues and slightly less income 
progressivity. As policymakers in other provinces consider adopting an HST, they, 
too, must consider different treatment for new housing and how their local markets 
will respond to the HST. 
ABOUT THE INSTITUTE 
The C.D. Howe Institute is a leading independent, economic and social policy research institution. 
The Institute promotes sound policies in these fields for all Canadians through its research and 
communications. Its nationwide activities include regular policy roundtables and presentations by 
policy staff in major regional centres, as well as before parliamentary committees. The Institute’s 
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O
ne of the most controversial 
aspects of Harmonized Sales 
Taxes (HSTs) is the tax 
treatment of new housing. This 
Backgrounder examines the economic 
impact on housing of the planned 
Ontario Harmonized Sales Tax 
(OHST) and points to what other 
provinces considering an HST can 
learn from the Ontario experience. 
Our analysis asks how alternative tax regimes for new 
housing will affect: 
• The size and quality of homes Ontarians choose 
to purchase; 
• The value of land available for residential
development and the resulting returns to
landowners and developers; and
• The total tax revenues that accrue to all three
levels of government.
By considering the likely response of individuals and 
markets to the HST, we are able to estimate the 
economic welfare cost of the tax, which measures the 
economic burden it places on new home buyers and 
developers, depending on its design. We can then 
compare the estimated loss in economic welfare with 
the gains to government from additional revenues. 
We analyze the likely impact of both Ontario’s 
original OHST design, as proposed in the 2009 
Budget, and the subsequently revised design on the 
housing market in the Greater Toronto Area. We find 
that the revised HST plan is a significant improvement 
over the original proposal, with lower economic cost 
and less impact on buyer decisions. The revised plan 
represents a level-playing-field approach that will not 
distort new housing construction relative to other 
sectors of the provincial economy.  
On balance, the HST is an intelligent tax reform 
that is likely to boost investment and economic 
efficiency, while reducing tax compliance costs for 
taxpayers.  Our analysis of the tax treatment of new 
housing may therefore be of special relevance to the 
other provinces – Saskatchewan, Manitoba and Prince 
Edward Island – that have not yet harmonized their 
provincial sales taxes. To further discussion of the 
issues for those provinces, we then provide an analysis 
of the original and revised approaches assuming an 
unlimited supply of land, which is probably a more 
appropriate assumption in those regions. 
Getting It Right: The Evolution of the 
Ontario HST on Housing 
When Ontario announced in its 2009 Budget that it 
would adopt an HST on July 1, 2010, combining the 
current federal Goods and Services Tax (GST) and 
provincial retail sales tax (RST), it signalled major 
changes for the tax rate on new houses. Under the 
province’s original budget proposal in March 2009, 
the HST on new houses valued up to $400,000 
would, through rebates to buyers, effectively be 
2 percent. Since it has been estimated that the current 
retail sales tax adds between 1.5 percent and 
3 percent to the cost of a typical home in most 
Ontario cities (CMHC, 2009), the combined effect 
of the HST reform would be to reduce taxes on 
housing for many new home buyers. 
As originally conceived, purchases of new houses 
valued over $500,000 would be subject to an 
8 percent HST. Meanwhile, new houses in the 
$400,000 to $500,000 range would be taxed on a 
sliding scale designed to “recapture” the tax revenue 
loss from the lower-priced homes. Thus, between the 
prices of $400,000 and $500,000, the effective tax 
rate on housing would be much higher than the 
statutory 8 percent. This recapture plus the existing 
taxes on new housing would have increased the 
overall effective tax rate to 47.3 percent on houses 
in that price range. 
In response to criticism, the Ontario government 
amended its original proposal. On June 18, 2009, it 
announced that new houses selling below $400,000 
would still be taxed at the planned effective 2 percent 
tax rate, while houses $400,000 and over would pay 
HST of $8,000 (2 percent of $400,000) plus 8 
percent on the value in excess of $400,000. Under 
this revised proposal, the effective tax rate under the 
The authors would like to thank Richard Bird and members of the C.D. Howe Institute Tax Competitiveness Council for their comments  on 
an earlier draft of this report. 
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Table 1:  Taxes on New Housing in the City of Toronto 
Ontario Land Transfer Tax 
On the first $55,000 = 0.5% 
$55,001 to $250,000 = $275 plus 1% of price minus $55,000 
$250,001 to $400,000 = $2,225 plus 1.5% of price minus $250,000 
Above $400,000 =  $4,475 plus 2% of price minus $400,000 
City of Toronto Land Transfer Tax 
On the first $55,000 = 0.5% 
$55,001 to $400,000 = $275 plus 1% of price minus $55,000 
Above $400,001  =  $3,450 plus 2% of price minus $400,000 
Federal Goods and Services Tax 
On the first $350,000 = 3.2% on the entire amount 
$350,001 to $450,000 = 11.3% times price less $28,350 
Above $450,001 = 5.0% on the entire amount 
OHST on New Housing 
Original Proposal 
Up to $400,000 = 2% on the entire amount 
$400,001 to $500,000 = $8,000 plus 32% of price minus $400,000 
Above $500,001 = 8% on the entire amount 
Revised Proposal 
Up to $400,000 = 2% on the entire amount 
Above $400,001 = $8,000 plus 8% of price minus $400,000 
Note: First-time homebuyers receive a limited rebate under the City of Toronto and Ontario Land Transfer taxes. 
Source: Dachis, Duranton and Turner (2008), Canada Revenue Agency (2009), Ontario (2009). 
OHST never exceeds 8 percent. This cap should 
improve economic incentives to purchase new 
homes but likely will result in substantial losses in 
tax revenues. British Columbia proposed the 
same formula when it announced it would adopt 
the HST.1 
One complicating factor in assessing the OHST 
impact on new housing is that there are other taxes 
to be considered. New housing in Toronto, for 
example, is subject to the province’s Land Transfer 
Tax, the City of Toronto Land Transfer Tax as well as 
the federal GST (see Table 1).2 To assess the impact 
of the OHST, we need to consider its effects on these 
other sources of tax revenues. British Columbia also 
applies a Provincial Property Transfer Tax, and results 
are broadly applicable in other provinces, albeit with 
different rates.3 
According to our estimates, the original OHST 
proposal would have imposed a substantial burden 
on households purchasing new houses valued at 
1 Provinces that have already harmonized tax bases with the GST treat new housing differently. Quebec provides an HST rebate for new homes under 
$200,000, but claws back that rebate on homes over $225,000. Nova Scotia also provides a limited rebate of the provincial component of HST on 
new housing to first-time homebuyers to a maximum of $1,500. 
2 Municipal development charges are also levied on new housing, but these are not included in the current analysis. These are more 
appropriately defined as user fees for municipal infrastructure, rather than taxes. 
3 The B.C. provincial sales tax rate is 7 percent and the provincial component of the HST will be the same. The Provincial Property Transfer Tax 
is 1 percent on the value of a house less than $200,000, and $2,000 plus 2 percent of the value of a house over $200,000. 
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more than $400,000. The combined economic cost 
to buyers of new homes and to the government – 
from the reduced revenues from the land transfer tax 
and GST – would have been as high as $1.35 for 
each dollar raised through the OHST. 
The ratio of the welfare loss to the additional 
OHST revenues on new housing would have made 
Ontario’s original proposal an economically costly 
source of tax revenue compared to other types of 
taxes.4 The above estimate of the welfare loss per 
dollar of revenue may be high if the HST causes a 
decline in the price of land available for housing 
development – a likely outcome in British 
Columbia, particularly Vancouver, where the supply 
of land for new housing is relatively fixed. Such a 
reduction in land prices would mitigate, but not 
eliminate, the impact of the tax on consumers. In 
Ontario’s case, if the OHST’s impact is to reduce the 
price of land, the welfare cost of the original proposal 
could have dropped to $1.16 for every dollar of 
revenue. 
Under the revised OHST proposal, the high-range 
estimate of the welfare loss per dollar of additional 
total tax revenue from new housing is $1.18 – a 
figure that is comparable to typical estimates of the 
welfare loss from other taxes, using similar economic 
models. Although the new proposal likely will yield 
lower tax revenues, it should reduce the distortions 
and welfare losses caused by the tax on new housing. 
Overall, we consider the revised OHST to be 
better than the original proposal from a tax policy 
perspective – the higher tax revenues and greater 
progressivity of the original OHST would have been 
achieved at an excessively high cost. That proposal’s 
high marginal tax rates would also have resulted in 
other distortions not reflected in our calculations, 
such as the sale of “shell housing” that would sell for 
under $400,000 and qualify for the reduced tax rate, 
with additional improvements added at a later date.5 
The revised OHST, by comparison, can be 
implemented at a lower welfare cost. 
Our analysis is necessarily one of choosing among 
“second-best” policy alternatives. In economic terms, 
there is nothing special about housing consumption. 
Indeed, most economists believe under a value-added 
tax such as the HST, housing should be subject to 
the same tax rate as other consumption goods. As we 
discuss below, for social, political and administrative 
reasons, full taxation of residential housing is likely 
impossible. The question remains how to deliver a 
tax rebate to lower-priced homes with minimal 
disruption to housing markets. 
Marginal and Average Tax Rates 
under the OHST 
The marginal tax rate (MTR) on housing is 
calculated as the tax paid on each additional dollar 
spent to purchase a newly built home. The MTR on 
new housing combines the impact of the Ontario 
Land Transfer Tax, the City of Toronto Land Transfer 
Tax, the federal GST and the OHST (Figure 1). We 
show the MTR for three scenarios: 1) under the 
previous Ontario retail sales tax, which has an 
assumed 2 percent effective tax rate on new housing 
embedded in the construction cost;  2) under the 
original proposal for the OHST and, finally, 3) 
under the revised OHST proposal for housing 
valued in excess of $400,000.6 
Although there is currently no provincial sales tax 
levied on new housing sales in Ontario, the inputs 
used in the construction of housing – tools, 
materials, etc. – are taxed, which is estimated to add 
between 1.5 and 3 per cent to a typical new house in 
Ontario (CMHC, 2009).7 The effect of a rebate 
reducing HST on housing under $400,000 to 2 per 
cent will therefore be to reduce the combined tax 
paid on many such homes. 
Smart (2007) estimates that Ontario collected over 
$1.5 billion in RST revenue from residential and 
non-residential construction inputs in 2002, while 
British Columbia collected over $500 million in RST 
revenues from the same source.  The elimination of 
these taxes on inputs in the residential construction 
sector, together with the proposed HST rebates with 
an estimated tax expenditure of up to $1 billion 
4 Previous analysis of land transfer taxes, which apply in part to new housing, by Dachis, Duranton and Turner (2008) also indicates that these 
taxes impose a high welfare cost per dollar of tax revenue. 
5 See Bob Aaron “HST will box home buyers, builders into bizarre deals,” Toronto Star, May 2, 2009. 
6 Revenue from all taxes on housing priced at less than $400,000 is not expected to change. 
7 The lower figure applies in markets like Toronto where the value of land is a relatively high proportion of the cost of a home, so that RST taxes 
on construction inputs become a relatively smaller proportion. 
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annually in Ontario will therefore reduce substantially 
the net revenues obtained from housing construction. 
Under the original OHST proposal in the Ontario 
budget, the marginal tax rate for new house sales in 
the $400,000 to $500,000 range, as noted above, 
would have increased to as high as 47.3 percent from 
the current 17.3 percent rate. Under the revised 
OHST, the marginal tax rate on new housing in the 
$400,000 to $450,000 range will be 23.3 percent, 
and will decline to 17.0 percent when the value of 
new housing exceeds $450,000.8 The total marginal 
tax rate falls at $450,000 because that is the value at 
which a GST new-housing rebate for homes under 
$350,000 has been fully recaptured. 
Figure 2 shows the average tax rates on new 
housing under the original and revised Ontario 
proposals. In both cases, the average tax rates will 
increase as the value of new housing increases, but 
average tax rates are significantly lower under the 
revised OHST. 
The OHST’s Effect on the Housing Market 
In evaluating any tax, two key questions are: how 
does the tax distort economic decisions? and who 
bears the burden of the tax? 
The price of new housing depends largely on the 
available supply of land. Take two examples – an area 
with very limited available land and another with 
abundant land for new housing. The first example 
may therefore be most applicable to urban areas of 
British Columbia and Ontario while the second 
applies to large parts of Saskatchewan or Manitoba – 
provinces that have yet to adopt the HST. Rural 
areas tend to have an elastic supply of land, whereas 
cities with limited space and strict zoning regulations 
have a fixed amount of land available for new 
housing. In both cases, the simple laws of supply and 
demand are at work. 
Example one: An increase in taxes leads to a 
reduction in the demand for new housing, which 
implies a reduction in the price of land. If the supply 
of land for housing is fixed, the effect of the tax is to 
reduce the value of undeveloped land available for 
housing construction.  As a result,  landowners and 
developers bear a larger share of the burden of the 
HST, housing price increases due to the tax become 
smaller, and the reduction in housing demand and its 
resulting welfare cost is mitigated.9 Thus the case of 
fixed land supply provides our lower-bound estimate 
of the welfare cost of the HST reform. 
Some new home buyers purchasing low-cost 
homes might be better off if land prices fell far 
enough to result in a lower pre-tax price for new 
housing. The tax reforms in the revised HST 
proposal will have important distributional effects, 
but we still expect that the total losses imposed by 
the OHST on new homebuyers and landowners will 
exceed the additional tax revenues. 
Example two: If there is an abundant supply of 
land that can be used either for housing or other 
purposes such as agriculture, then the burden of the 
HST will be shifted forward to homebuyers, in the 
form of higher prices. The assumption of a highly 
elastic supply of land for housing therefore provides 
our upper-bound estimate of the welfare cost of the 
revised HST. 
Turning to the distortionary effect of the HST on 
housing purchases, Figure 3 illustrates a consumer 
budget line reflecting the trade-offs that households 
face in making consumption decisions between more 
expensive housing and other goods.10 The shape of 
the budget line in Figure 3 reflects the fact that the 
marginal price of housing varies with the amount of 
new housing consumed.  In particular, there is  a 
“kink” in the budget line at the $400,000 level under 
the original OHST proposal because the marginal 
price of housing increases there from 1.158 to 1.473. 
In other words, an additional dollar spent on 
housing in the $400,000 to $450,000 range would 
mean that a household would have to give up 
$1.473 of spending on other consumption goods. 
8 The MTR in British Columbia will be 20.3 percent for new houses between $400,000 and $450,000 and 14 percent for houses over $450,000 
because the HST rate is one percentage point lower and there is no 2 percent municipal property transfer tax. The land and property transfer 
taxes are equivalent in British Columbia and Ontario on the value of homes over $400,000. 
9 We assume that new housing is produced with capital and land according to a Cobb-Douglas production function. Land was assumed to 
represent 50 percent of the total costs of producing housing. The supply of land for housing was assumed to be fixed, while the supply of 
capital to the residential sector was assumed to be perfectly elastic. 
10 We focus on the segment of the budget line where the value of housing is greater than or equal to $400,000 because this is the range that is 
directly affected by the introduction of the OHST. 
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Under the original OHST proposal of Figure 3,   the 
budget line becomes flatter at the $450,000 level, 
where the marginal price of housing declines from 
1.473 to 1.41, with the phase out of the GST relief 
for new housing at that point.  An additional 
kink in the budget line occurs at $500,000, where 
the marginal price of housing declines from 1.41 
to 1.17. 
How would this non-linear budget line have 
affected household decisions to purchase a new 
home? There would have been “bunching” of 
households at a kink in the budget line and there 
would be “gaps” in the purchases – price ranges 
where there are very few purchases – centred on the 
corners in the budget lines. 
We attempt to describe the critical tax impact on 
behaviour question in Figure 4. It shows the 
expected distribution of purchases of new housing 
for different price levels induced by the budget line 
shown in Figure 3. 
Bunching occurs at the kink (downturn) in the 
budget line because households over a wide income 
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range would, as a group, find it optimal to purchase 
a $400,000 house. In other words, these households 
would prefer a $400,000 house to a $401,000 house 
because they value an additional $1,000 of housing 
quality less than $1,473 in additional costs. 
Because housing is a “normal good,” higher 
income households are likely to purchase new houses 
worth more than $400,000. However, at some 
wealth level, households will be indifferent to 
purchasing a house in the $400,000-$450,000 range 
or buying one in the $450,000-$500,000 range.11 
Households at a slightly higher income level may 
prefer a new home above the $450,000 level. As a 
consequence, there would be few purchases of new 
houses in a price range centred on $450,000, even 
though housing becomes relatively cheaper at this 
threshold when the marginal tax rates are taken into 
consideration. Similarly, there will be a gap in the 
purchases of houses centred on the $500,000 level. 
With the revised OHST, there will still be a 
downtrend in households’ budget lines at $400,000, 
but it will be less dramatic than under the original 
proposal because the marginal price will only 
increase 1.233 times instead of 1.473. There will also 
be a gap in the demand for housing centered on the 
$450,000 level where the marginal price of housing 
declines to 1.17. 
The Impact of the HST on Households 
and Tax Revenues 
As the above brief description indicates, analyzing 
the impact of the OHST on household decision-
making is difficult because of the bunching that is 
predicted to occur at the $400,000 level and the 
expected gaps in housing sales centred around 
$450,000 and $500,000. 
In the following section, we simulate the OHST 
impact by assuming that all households have the 
same preferences for new housing.12 But households 
differ in terms of their lifetime incomes, and we have 
used the projected distribution of new GTA house 
sales to estimate the OHST impact at different 
wealth levels. The GTA sales pattern is likely to be 
similar in other real estate markets, but some 
differences will exist. 
The Original OHST Proposal  
Under the original proposal, the 38.7 percent of 
householders purchasing a new home worth more 
than $400,000 would be bunched at the $400,000 
price level for new houses because of the significant 
increase in the marginal tax rate on new housing 
(Panel A of Table 2). The ratio of the total welfare loss 
caused by the distortion in housing purchases to the 
additional OHST revenues on new housing is 
estimated to be 1.22. However, this ratio does not 
include the changes in provincial, federal and 
municipal tax revenues from the Ontario Land 
Transfer Tax, the GST, the Toronto Land Transfer Tax 
or the OHST on the sales of other goods and services 
arising from the increase in taxes on new housing. 
When the effects of the OHST on the other tax 
revenues are taken into consideration, the economic 
loss per average dollar of total tax revenue would have 
been as high as 1.35. (Table 3, Column 1). This result 
demonstrates that the original OHST proposal on 
new housing would have been a very high-cost source 
of tax revenues. The marginal cost of an additional 
housing tax dollar would have been even higher. 
Where the supply of land for housing is fixed, the 
price of land in a regime with the original OHST 
would have declined by about 4 percent, and the 
price of new housing would have declined by about 
2 percent. Approximately the same proportion of 
households would have been “bunched” at the 
$400,000-price purchase level. On average, they 
would have gained $7,145 from lower pre-tax 
housing prices, but this gain is less than the $8,40013 
reduction in the price of new housing at this level 
because many of these purchasers would have been 
buying smaller, lower quality houses than they 
otherwise would like to own. 
The other households in the over $400,000 
segment of the new housing market would have been 
worse off with the original OHST relative to the RST. 
When the projected gains and losses to all groups are 
11  In terms of the standard theory of consumer behaviour, a household’s indifference curve between consumption and housing will be tangent to 
both segments of the budget line. 
12  We describe consumer utility with a Cobb-Douglas utility function where households spend one-third of their lifetime incomes on housing. 
13  The reduction in the new house prices for this group is predicted to be 2.1 percent of $400,000 or $8,400. 
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Table 2: Range of Impacts on Households’ Well-Being – Original and Revised OHST Proposals 
Panel A: Original OHST Proposal  Panel B: Revised OHST Proposal 
Proportion  Range of  Range of Ratio  Proportion  Range of  Range of Ratio 
of New  Average Welfare  of Average Welfare  of New  Average Welfare  of Average Welfare 
Wealth  Homes over  Losses (Gain if  Loss to Average  Homes over  Losses (Gain if  Loss to Average 
Range  $400K  Negative)  Wealth  $400K  Negative)  Wealth 
$1,371K to  38.7%  -$7,145 to  -0.00486 to 0.00234  8.0%  -$356 to $130  -0.00025 to 0.0001 
$1,611K  $3,611 
$1,611K to  15.2%  $6,995 to  0.00411 to 0.0112  20.9%  $1,210 to $1,710  0.00082 to 0.0012 
$1,804K  $19,010 
$1,804K to  3.3%  $17,269 to  0.00943 to 0.0165  6.3%  $2,460 to $2,980  0.00159 to 0.0019 
$1,859K  $30,110 
Over  42.8% $32,922  to  0.01045 to 0.0174  64.8%  $24,400 to  0.00871 to 0.009 
$1,859K  $54,970  $25,400 
Note: The low welfare cost estimates are based on a model where the supply of land for housing is fixed and landowners bear a large share of the welfare cost
of the tax. The high welfare cost estimates assume an elastic land supply where home buyers bear the full burden of the tax.
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Table 3: Summary of Impact of Original and Revised Ontario Policies for New Housing over $400,000a
Original Proposal  Revised Version 
in Ontario Budget 2009  June 18, 2009 
OHST Marginal Tax Rates 
$400-$500K  32.0%  8.0% 
$500-$600K  8.0%  8.0% 
$600K+  8.0%  8.0% 
Total Marginal Tax Rates 
$400-$450K  47.3%  23.3% 
$450-$500K  41.0%  17.0% 
$500-$600K  17.0%  17.0% 
$600K+  17.0%  17.0% 
Proportion of Households Bunched at $400K  38.7%  8.0% 
Welfare Loss per Dollar of the Increase in HST Revenue on New Housing  1.22  1.08 
Welfare Loss per Dollar of the Increase in Total Tax Revenues  1.35  1.18 
Additional HST Revenue on New Housing per Household  $23.6K  $15.7K 
Additional Total Tax Revenue per Household  $21.3K  $14.4K 
a These computations assume that the OHST is fully reflected in the price of new housing. 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
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combined, the loss per additional dollar of tax revenue 
for all levels of government would have been 1.16. 
The Revised OHST Proposal 
Under the revised Ontario proposal, the proportion 
of households bunched at the $400,000 price level 
for new houses will fall to about 8 percent because of 
the significant reduction in the marginal tax rate on 
new housing (Panel B of Table 2). As a result of the 
lower average tax rates, the additional total tax 
revenues will decline by about one-third (see 
Column 2 of Table 3). The welfare loss per dollar of 
additional total tax revenue declines from 1.35 under 
the original proposal to 1.18. 
The welfare cost of raising tax revenues through 
the OHST on new housing is somewhat higher than 
the Baylor and Beauséjour (2004) estimate of the 
welfare cost of raising revenue through a general sales 
tax. However, in light of the high marginal tax rates 
on housing, a higher cost of raising revenue through 
the OHST is to be expected. The distributional 
objective of sheltering lower-cost housing from a tax 
rate increase entails a somewhat higher welfare cost 
for this source of tax revenue. Overall, the new 
proposal will significantly reduce the purchasing 
pattern distortions caused by the tax on new housing 
and generate additional tax revenues at a relatively 
low social cost. 
The distribution of the burden under the revised 
OHST is less progressive than under the original, 
based on a fixed land supply assumption for Ontario, 
because the revised OHST would have little effect on 
land prices. The 8 percent of households that we 
predict will be bunched at the $400,000 new house 
purchasing level under the revised OHST will be 
better off as a result of the slight reduction in 
housing prices, but the average expected gain of 
$356 is very modest. 
Other provinces considering harmonizing sales 
taxes should consider the costs and benefits of the 
two Ontario proposals, summarized in Table 3. We 
present these estimates based on the assumption that 
land is relatively elastic for the sake of comparison to 
other provinces where this is likely to be the case. 
Further, the distribution of sales in these provinces 
will be different than in the Greater Toronto Area, 
and with considerably lower average prices. These 
results should be considered a template for other 
provinces, where they would vary based on local 
conditions. 
Taxes and the Resale Housing Market 
Unlike most things taxed by the HST, housing is a 
long-lived asset – with a well- developed resale 
market. This creates special challenges for designing 
the taxation of housing under HST – and for our 
analysis of the tax. 
Under the HST, as under many countries’ value 
added taxes (VAT), new homes are subject to tax – at 
a reduced rate – while resale homes and most 
residential rents are tax-exempt. An ideal VAT on 
housing would look quite different: both newly built 
and resale homes would be subject to tax at the full 
rate, but sellers of resale homes would receive a credit 
for tax paid at the time of the earlier purchase (Ebrill 
et al., 2001). This would generate more revenue, 
avoid changing relative prices of new versus resale 
houses and would result in the tax burden being 
more fairly shared among successive house owners. 
However, such an ideal VAT is clearly 
impracticable. There is often a decades-long gap 
between a purchase and subsequent sale of a house, 
so that record keeping for such a tax would be 
difficult. More important, the tax would apply in full 
to sales of existing homes at the time of introduction 
of the tax – with no credit for tax paid on the earlier 
purchase, since there was no VAT at the time – 
which would no doubt generate considerable 
political opposition from existing homeowners. 
Meanwhile, the existing, imperfect treatment of 
housing under the HST creates a different set of 
economic problems that are not part of our formal 
model. First, since newly built homes are subject to 
tax while resale homes are not, if the two goods are 
close substitutes (they should be), owners of existing 
homes at the introduction of the tax will receive a 
windfall gain in the value of their homes. This is 
evidently unfair to future taxpayers, but since future 
taxpayers do not vote today, they are frequently on 
the short end of transition arrangements like this. 
Another challenge is that potential windfall gains 
for existing homeowners raise the price of tax-exempt 
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resale homes. This result will create excess burdens in 
the market for resale homes analogous to the excess 
burdens on newly built homes analyzed in this 
Backgrounder. Since the stock of existing homes is 
large relative to the flow of newly built homes, 
incorporating this effect into our welfare cost 
estimates would likely result in a very large increase 
in our estimate of the excess burden per dollar of tax 
revenue of the proposed HST.14 Just how much 
excess burden, however, depends on how easily 
consumers substitute resale homes for newly built 
homes. 
Conclusion 
While the benefits of HST to the economy are well 
established, achieving the right balance in applying 
the tax to new houses has been difficult. We find that 
the revised version of the Ontario HST improves the 
tax-rate structure because it reduces the marginal 
effective tax rates on new housing. Relative to the 
original proposal, consumer decisions about the size 
and quality of the home they desire are less distorted. 
This is achieved by adopting a rate structure that is 
similar to that of a “flat tax.” That is, purchases of 
new housing above a certain threshold, in this case 
$400,000, will be subject to a constant marginal tax 
rate. British Columbia has adopted a similar flat tax 
rate structure that is superior to the claw-back rate 
structure of the original Ontario proposal and the 
GST new-housing rebate. Such a flat tax reduces 
disincentive effects and raises revenue at a relatively 
low social cost. However, the distribution of the tax 
burden is less progressive and the total amount of 
revenues collected will fall. Another important 
consideration is that the HST impact depends on 
the availability of land for new housing, because 
when land is in plentiful supply the burden of the tax 
change tends to fall on homebuyers. Policymakers in 
other provinces should keep in mind that the 
economic impact of any housing rebate will depend 
on local conditions. 
14  This additional excess burden is in some sense transitional, since eventually all existing homes will depreciate and be replaced by new built 
homes. But the transition in this case is very long, indeed. 
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